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Abstract	I	argue	that	medieval	solutions	to	the	limit	decision	problem	imply	four-dimensionalism,	i.e.	the	view	according	to	which	substances	that	persist	through	 time	are	extended	 through	 time	as	well	as	 through	space,	and	have	different	temporal	parts	at	different	times.	
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Four-dimensionalism	 is	 the	 view	 according	 to	 which	 substances	 are	extended	through	time	as	well	as	through	space;	just	like	a	substance	is	thought	to	be	extended	through	space	by	having	different	spatial	parts	at	different	 places,	 four-dimensionalists	 believe	 that	 substances	 are	extended	 through	 time	 by	 having	 different	 temporal	 parts	 at	 different	times.		Boosted	by	a	growing	battery	of	arguments,	four-dimensionalism	is	presumably	enjoying	its	Golden	Age,	and	has	forced	his	foes	on	the	back	foot1.	 Somehow	unsurprisingly,	 things	 used	 to	 be	 different	 some	 eight	hundred	years	ago,	when,	with	the	possible	exception	of	Bonaventure,	the	overwhelming	majority	of	 scholastic	philosophers	maintained	 the	rival	view	 –	 nowadays	 called	 three-dimensionalism	 –	 according	 to	 which	substances	 persist	 through	 time	 without	 having	 temporal	 parts2.	However,	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 that	 philosophers	 commit	 themselves	 to	doctrines	which	they	deny.	In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	standard	medieval	accounts	 of	 change	 –	 standard	 solutions	 to	 the	 so-called	 limit	 decision	problem	in	particular	–	trigger	an	argument	that	ultimately	leads	to	the	four-dimensionalist	view	of	persistence.																																									 																					*	 I	 am	 grateful	 to	 Claudio	 Calosi,	 Ilaria	 Canavotto,	 Frédéric	Goubier,	 Can	 Loewe,	 Paolo	Natali,	 Magali	 Roques,	 Cecilia	 Trifogli	 and	 to	 the	 members	 of	 the	 audience	 of	 the	conference	Limit	Decision	Problems:	Medieval	and	Contemporary	Perspectives	in	Berlin	for	useful	questions	and	fruitful	comments	on	earlier	drafts	of	this	paper.	
1	For	a	sympathetic	review	of	the	arguents	in	favour	of	four-dimensionalism,	I	refer	the	reader	 to	 T.	 Sider,	 Four-Dimensionalism:	 An	 Ontology	 of	 Persistence	 and	 Time	 (Oxford	2001).	
2	 R.	 Cross,	 “Four-Dimensionalism	 and	 Identity	 Across	 Time:	 Henry	 Ghent	 vs.	Bonaventure,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy	27	(1999),	393-414.	
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The	paper	is	in	two	main	parts.	The	first	one	sets	the	stage	by	presenting	the	 limit	 decision	 problem	 and	 the	 standard	 solutions	 adopted	 by	 the	scholastics	 during	 the	 period	 when	 controversies	 concerning	 this	problem	 flourished	 the	most,	 i.e.	 during	 the	 thirteenth	 and	 fourteenth	centuries.	Building	on	a	tension	in	these	standard	solutions	raised	by	Paul	Vincent	Spade,	the	second	part	of	the	paper	argues	that	those	standard	solutions	 make	 persistence	 without	 temporal	 parts	 impossible.	 The	paper	 concludes	 then	 that	 if	 substances	 persist,	 they	 so	 by	 having	temporal	parts.	
1	 Medieval	Solutions	to	the	Limit	Decision	Problem	
1.1	 The	Limit	Decision	Problem3	A	 light	 suddenly	 switches	 off.	 Consider	 the	 instant	 t	 at	 which	 the	switching	 occurs.	 Before	 t,	 the	 light	 is	 on,	 after	 t,	 it	 is	 off,	 i.e.	 not	 on.	However	at	 the	 instant	 t,	 is	 it	 still	 on	or	 already	off?	 In	principle,	 four	options	offer	themselves:	(1)	 At	t,	the	light	is	on.	(2)	 At	t,	the	light	is	off.	(3)	 At	t,	the	light	is	neither	on	nor	off.	(4)	 At	t,	the	light	is	both	on	and	off.	Many	philosophers	have	long	thought	that	options	(3)	and	(4)	must	be	excluded,	 for	 they	 go	 against	 the	 law	 of	 non-contradiction,	 the	 law	 of	excluded	middle	or	the	concept	of	negation	itself.	Options	(3)	and	(4)	excluded,	one	may	think	that	there	is	no	real	problem	here:	when	a	light	switches	from	on	to	off,	there	will	be	an	instant	t1	at	which	it	is	on,	immediately	followed	by	another	instant	t2	at	which	is	off.	In	 that	case,	a	choice	between	(1)	and	(2)	seems	not	 to	be	so	pressing	after	all.	However,	this	easy	solution	is	excluded	if	one	thinks	that	time	is	continuous.	 Indeed,	 if	we	assume	that	 time	 is	continuous,	between	any																																									 																					
3	The	following	account	of	the	Limit	Decision	Problem	and	its	treatment	is	mainly	based	on	 G.	 Priest,	 In	 Contradiction.	 A	 Study	 of	 the	 Transconsistent	 (Dordrecht	 1987):	 N.	Kretzmann,	“Incipit/Desinit,”	in	Matter	and	Time,	Space	and	Motion,	eds.	J.	Machamer	and	P.	 Turnbull	 (Columbus	 1976),	 101-136;	 S.	 Knuuttila	 and	 A.	 I.	 Lehtinen,	 “Change	 and	Contradiction:	 A	 Fourteenth	 Century	 Controversy,”	 Synthese	 40	 (1979),	 189-207;	 P.	Spade,	 “How	 to	 Start	 and	 Stop.	Walter	Burley	 on	 the	 Instant	 of	 Transition,”	 Journal	 of	
Philosophical	Research	19	(1994),	193-221;	A.	de	Libera,	“La	problématique	de	l’	instant	du	changement’	au	XIIIème	siècle:	contribution	à	l’histoire	des	Sophismata	Physicalia,”	in	
Studies	in	medieval	Natural	Philosophy,	ed.	S.	Caroti	(Firenze	1989)	and	N.	Strobach,	The	
Moment	of	Change.	A	Systematic	History	 in	 the	Philosphy	of	Space	and	Time	 (Dordrecht	1998).	
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two	instants	t1	and	t2	there	will	always	be	a	third	instant	t3:	no	instant	can	immediately	follow	another.	In	 light	 of	 the	 assumption	 that	 time	 is	 continuous,	 the	 choice	between	option	 (1)	 and	 option	 (2)	 becomes	 indeed	 pressing.	 In	making	 such	 a	choice,	we	are	choosing	whether	t	is	the	last	instant	at	which	the	light	is	on	or	the	first	 instant	at	which	 it	 is	off.	And	given	that	there	cannot	be	immediately	 adjacent	 instants,	 there	 cannot	 be	 both	 a	 last	 instant	 at	which	the	light	is	on	and	a	first	instant	at	which	it	 is	off.	Hence,	we	are	choosing	whether		(1’)		 there	is	a	last	instant	at	which	the	light	is	on	and	no	first	instant	at	which	the	light	is	off		or		(2’)		 there	is	no	last	instant	at	which	it	is	still	on	and	a	first	instant	at	which	it	is	off.		This	result	allows	us	to	understand	why	this	problem	is	sometimes	called	the	limit	decision	problem.	The	problem	can	be	equivalently	described	in	terms	of	the	kind	of	temporal	limits	that	a	state	–	such	as	the	light’s	being	on	–	has.	Let	us	introduce	a	bit	of	technical	terminology,	and	distinguish	between	 extrinsic/open	 and	 intrinsic/closed	 temporal	 limits,	 and	 in	particular	let	us	say	that	a	state	is	intrinsically	limited	at	its	beginning	–	its	first	limit	is	closed	–	if	and	only	if	it	has	a	first	instant;	otherwise	it	is	extrinsically	limited	at	its	beginning	–	its	first	limit	is	open.	Let	us	also	say	that	a	state	is	intrinsically	limited	at	its	end	–	its	last	limit	is	closed	–	if	and	only	if	it	has	a	last	instant;	otherwise	it	is	extrinsically	limited	at	its	end	–	its	last	limit	is	open.	Choosing	between	option	(1)	and	(2)	means	choosing	whether		(1’’)	 the	light’s	being	on	is	intrinsically	limited	at	its	end	–	its	last	limit	is	closed.		or		(2’’)	 the	light’s	being	on	is	extrinsically	limited	at	its	end	–	its	last	limit	is	open.		Square	brackets	have	been	conveniently	employed	to	represent	a	state’s	being	 extrinsically	 or	 intrinsically	 limited	 at	 one	 hand,	 where	 square	
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brackets	point	towards	a	state	that	is	intrinsically	limited.	For	example,	we	will	represent	the	fact	that	the	light’s	being	on	is	intrinsically	limited	at	its	end,	i.e.	option	(1),	as	follows:	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	1.	The	light’s	being	on	is	intrinsically	limited	at	its	end.	So	it	seems	that	we	should	indeed	make	a	choice	between	option	(1)	and	option	(2).	However,	there	seems	to	be	no	reason	to	prefer	one	in	spite	of	the	other.	If	there	are	no	clear	grounds	on	which	the	choice	can	be	made,	the	 choice	will	 end	up	being	arbitrary,	 and	many	 find	 that	 this	kind	of	arbitrariness	 is,	when	dealing	with	philosophical	problems,	completely	out	of	place4.	Some	philosophers	 feel	 then	prompted	to	 find	reasons	to	prefer	one	of	the	first	two	options	over	the	other,	while	others	think	that	no	such	reason	can	be	found,	and	take	this	result	as	reason	to	take	the	other	two	options	more	seriously5.		
1.2 Medieval	Solutions	to	the	Limit	Decision	Problem:	the	Distinction	
between	Permanent	and	Successive	Entities	The	limit	decision	problem	–	which	is,	for	obvious	reasons,	also	called	the	problem	of	the	instant	of	change	–	is	known	and	discussed	at	least	since	Aristotle’s	Physics	and	Sofistical	Refutations6.	However	the	context	in	the	history	 of	 philosophy	 in	 which	 it	 has	 been	 most	 hotly	 discussed	 is	arguably	the	Latin	scholastics	of	the	thirteenth	and	fourteenth	century,	when	the	relevant	Aristotelian	texts	made	their	reappearance	in	the	Latin	world	after	their	diaspora	through	the	translatio	studiorum.	Scholastics	processed	the	problem	and,	in	the	footsteps	of	Aristotle,	or	at	least	of	the	Latin	Aristotle,	gave	it	a	distinctive	reading.	
																																								 																					
4	This	point	is	nicely	put	forward	in	Priest,	In	Contradiction.	
5	For	a	summary	of	the	solutions	to	the	limit	decision	problem	adopted	during	the	last	decades,	see	Strobach,	The	Moment	of	change,	part	II.	
6	For	an	overview	of	the	ancient	debate	on	the	limit	decision	problem,	see	Strobach,	The	
Moment	of	Change,	part	I,	ch.	1	and	2.	
on off 
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Most	medieval	solutions	to	the	problem	of	the	instant	of	change	share	a	common	default	setting.	First,	generally7	they	reject	options	(3)	and	(4).	Second,	they	do	not	make	a	choice	between	option	(1)	and	option	(2)	that	applies	to	all	possible	cases	of	change,	but	rather	think	that	both	options	apply	in	different	cases.	If	 one	 wants	 to	 understand	 what	 those	 different	 cases	 are,	 the	 most	important	 distinction	 to	 be	 introduced	 is	 certainly	 the	 distinction	between	permanent	 and	 successive	 entities,	which	 I	will	 explain	 in	 this	section,	and	apply	in	the	next	section	to	the	limit	decision	problem.	The	distinction	between	permanent	and	successive	entities	has	its	roots	in	 Aristotle’s	 Physics	 and,	 through	 Averroes	 commentaries,	 became	 a	
topos	of	medieval	metaphysics8.	The	distinction,	as	it	appears	through	the	history	of	medieval	philosophy,	is	of	central	importance	for	the	solution	of	the	limit	decision	problem	as	well	as	for	other	important	contexts,	such	as	the	ones	dealing	with	the	relation	between	God	on	the	one	hand	and	space	and	time	on	the	other9.	The	 distinction	 is	 nicely	 introduced	 and	 applied	 to	 the	 limit	 decision	problem	by	Walter	Burley	in	his	De	Primo	et	Ultimo	Instanti.	Given	that	later	we	will	analyse	an	argument	originally	put	forward	against	Burley’s	view	on	the	limit	decision	problem,	it	will	be	a	good	starting	point	to	see	how	 Burley	 himself	 introduces	 the	 distinction.	 The	 relevant	 passage	reads:	With	 respect	 to	 the	 first	 point,	 you	 must	 know	 that	 there	 is	 a	difference	between	a	permanent	thing	and	a	successive	one.	For	a	permanent	 thing,	 speaking	 about	 a	permanent	 thing	 in	 general,	 is	one	for	which	it	is	not	inconsistent	from	the	nature	of	the	thing	to	have	all	[its]	parts	simultaneously.	And	a	successive	thing	is	one	for	which	it	 is	 inconsistent	 from	the	nature	of	the	thing	to	have	all	 its	parts	simultaneously.	Indeed	it	belongs	to	its	nature	that	it	have	an	earlier	and	another,	later	one.	And	when	the	earlier	part	exists,	the	other	part	does	not	exist.	For	a	stone	is	a	permanent	thing,	because	it	is	not	inconsistent	for	a	stone	to	have	all	its	parts	simultaneously	in	the	same	measure.	But	a	day,	and	a	week,	and	so	on,	are	successive																																									 																					
7	With	 the	 notable	 exception	 of	 Quasi-Aristotelianism.	 See	 N.	 Kretzmann,	 “Continuity,	Contrariety,	Contradiction,	and	Change,”	in	Infinity	and	Continuity	in	Ancient	and	Medieval	
Thought,	 ed.	 N.	 Kretzmann	 (London,	 1982),	 270-296	 and	 P.	 V.	 Spade,	 “Quasi-Aristotelianism,”	in	Infinity	and	Continuity,	297-307.	
8	 A.	 de	 Libera,	 “La	 problématique	 de	 l’instant	 du	 changement”,	 51-52	 and	 R.	 Pasnau,	
Metaphysical	Themes	1274-1671	(Oxford,	2011),	ch.	18.	
9	Pasnau,	ibid.	and	R.	Pasnau,	“On	Existing	All	at	Once,”	in	God,	Eternity,	and	Time,	ed.	C.	Tapp	(Ashgate	2011),	11-28.	
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things	 because	 it	 is	 inconsistent	 for	 them	 to	 have	 all	 their	 parts	simultaneously.	For	it	is	inconsistent	with	a	day	that	when	it	is	the	first	hour,	it	is	the	third	[hour]. 10	Burley	 says	 that	 successive	 things	 are	 by	 nature	 such	 that	 they	 have	earlier	and	later	parts.	A	day,	for	example,	is	such	that	it	has	a	first	and	a	third	 hour.	 Earlier	 and	 later	 parts	 are	 such	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 had	simultaneously	 (or	 that	 they	cannot	be	simultaneous	with	each	other).	Indeed,	when	it	is	the	first	hour,	it	is	not	the	third	hour,	and	vice	versa.	On	the	other	hand,	permanent	things	are	by	nature	such	that	they	can	have	all	 their	 parts	 simultaneously	 (and	 therefore	 have	 no	 earlier	 and	 later	parts,	 which	 must	 be	 had	 at	 different	 times).	 Burley	 mentions	 the	example	of	a	stone,	the	nature	of	which	allows	it	to	have	all	its	parts	–	the	physical	particles	that	make	up	the	stone	–	at	the	same	time.	A	contemporary	philosopher	can	hardly	resist	the	temptation	to	see	here	in	 play	 a	 distinction	 she	 is	 familiar	 with,	 i.e.	 the	 distinction	 between	endurance	 and	 perdurance.	 Endurance	 and	 perdurance	 are	 notions	invoked	nowadays	to	explain	how	things	persist	through	time,	or	in	other	words,	how	is	it	possible	that	the	same	thing	exists	at	different	times.	On	the	 one	 hand,	 something	 perdures	 if	 and	 only	 if	 it	 persists	 by	 having	different	temporal	parts	at	different	times.	On	the	other	hand,	something	
endures	 if	 and	 only	 if	 it	 persists	 by	 being	 wholly	 present	 at	 different	times11.	A	contemporary	philosopher	will	be	tempted	to	see	a	parallelism	between	 Burley’s	 notion	 of	 “earlier	 and	 later	 parts”	 and	 the	contemporary	 notion	 of	 a	 temporal	 part,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 Burley’s	notion	of	“having	all	parts	simultaneously”	and	the	contemporary	notion	of	being	wholly	present.	
																																								 																					
10	Here	I	quote	Paul	Vincent	Spade’s	translation	of	Burley’s	text	that	can	be	found	in	his	“How	to	Start	and	Stop,”	199.	The	original	text	taken	from	Shapiro’s	edition	reads:	“Circa	primam	 est	 sciendum	 quod	 differentia	 est	 inter	 res	 permanen-	 tem	 et	 successivam,	quoniam	 res	 permanens,	 communiter	 loquendo	 de	 re	 permanente,	 est	 illa	 cui	 non	repugnat	ex	natura	rei	habere	omnes	partes	simuL	Et	res	successiva	est	illa	cui	repugnat	ex	natura	rei	habere	omnes	suas	partes	simul;	ymo	est	de	natura	sui	quod	habeat	unam	per	 temporem,	et	 aliam	posteriorem,	 et	quando	pars	prior	 est,	 pars	posterior	non	est.	Lapis	enim	est	res	permanens,	quia	 lapidi	non	repugnat	habere	omnes	partes	simul	 in	eadem	 mensura.	 Sed	 dies	 et	 septimana,	 et	 sie	 de	 aliis,	 sunt	 res	 successive,	 quia	 eis	repugnat	 habere	 omnes	 partes	 suas	 simul.	 Repugnat	 enim	 diei	 quod	 quando	 est	 hora	prima	quod	sit	 tertia.	 Intelligendum	ergo	est	per	rem	permanentem,	 illud	cuius	omnes	partes	sunt	simul,	vel	cui	non	repugnat	habere	omnes	suas	partes	simul.”	See	H.	and	C.	Shapiro,	 “De	 Primo	 et	 Ultimo	 Istanti	 des	 Walter	 Burley,”	 Archiv	 für	 Geschichte	 der	
Philosophie	47	(1965),	157-173.	
11	See	T.	Sider,	Four-Dimensionalism	and	D.	K.	Lewis,	On	the	Plurality	of	Worlds	(Oxford,	1986),	199.	
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One	 of	 the	 central	 debates	 in	 contemporary	 metaphysics	 is	 the	 one	concerning	 the	way	 in	which	substances	persist	 through	 time.	Do	 they	persist	by	enduring	or	by	perduring?	Those	who	think	 that	substances	endure	 –	 are	 wholly	 present	 at	 different	 times	 –	 are	 called	 three-dimensionalists,	 or	 also	 endurantists,	 whereas	 those	 who	 think	 that	substances	perdure	–	have	different	temporal	parts	at	different	times	–	are	 called	 four-dimensionalists,	 or	 also	 perdurantists.	 Three-dimensionalists	believe	that	substances	endure.	Yet,	they	may	–	and	often	do	–	think	that	other	entities,	such	as	intervals	of	time	or	events,	persist	by	perduring,	for	an	event	may	be	composed	by	different	phases	and	an	interval	of	time	by	different	instants,	which	count	as	temporal	parts	of	the	event	 and	 the	 interval,	 respectively.	 Given	 that	 Burley	 puts	 forward	 a	stone	as	an	example	of	a	permanent	thing,	and	a	day	as	an	example	of	a	successive	 thing,	 the	 contemporary	 philosopher	 will	 be	 tempted	 to	identify	Burley	–	together	with	the	majority	of	its	contemporaries	which	do,	or	would,	offer	similar	examples	–	as	a	three-dimensionalist.	These	parallelisms	and	 identifications	have	 indeed	been	proposed	and	endorsed	 by	 several	 contemporary	 scholars,	 and	 I	 add	 myself	 to	 that	list12.		
1.3 Medieval	Solutions	to	the	Limit	Decision	Problem:	the	Scholastics	
on	the	Temporal	Limits	of	Permanent	and	Successive	Entities	Now	that	the	distinction	between	permanent	and	successive	entities	has	been	 introduced,	 let	 us	 see	 how	 the	 scholastics	 applied	 it	 to	 the	 limit	decision	problem.	Recall	that	the	limit	decision	problem	has	to	do	with	the	temporal	limits	of	entities	–	such	as	the	being	off	of	a	 light	–	and	in	particular	with	the	question	of	whether	those	limits	are	open	or	closed.	In	that	context,	the	distinction	between	permanent	and	successive	entities	comes	in	because	most	medieval	scholars	though	that	whether	an	entity	has	open	or	closed	limits	 is	 primarily	 dependent	 on	 whether	 the	 entity	 is	 permanent	 or	successive.	The	so-called	common	theory,	which	was	seen	by	medieval	scholars	as	the	Aristotelian	theory,	claims	that	the	temporal	limits	of	permanent	entities																																									 																					
12	 See	 in	 particular	 R.	 Cross,	 “Four-Dimensionalism	 and	 Identity	 Across	 Time”	 and	 A.	Wood,	 “Mind	 the	Gap?	The	Principle	of	Non-Repeatability	and	Aquinas’	Account	of	 the	Resurrection,”	Oxford	Studies	in	Medieval	Philosophy	3	(2015),	99-127.	On	the	other	hand,	a	 more	 careful	 attitude	 would	 suggest	more	 investigation	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	permanent	 and	 successive	 things	 before	 subscribing	 to	 these	 parallelisms	 and	identifications.	However,	such	an	investigation	is	still	 lacking	in	the	literature	and	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	
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are	both	 closed,	whereas	 the	 temporal	 limits	of	 successive	 entities	 are	both	 open13.	 The	 scholastics	 proposed	 further	 distinctions	 in	 order	 to	specify	whether	a	state	such	as	the	light’s	being	on	counted	as	permanent	and	 successive.	 However,	 they	 did	 not	 think	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 limit	assignment	held	for	states	only.	They	though	that	every	permanent	entity	has	both	limits	closed	and	every	successive	entity	has	both	limits	open.	So,	for	example,	they	think	that	permanent	entities	such	as	human	beings	and	stones	have	a	first	and	a	last	instant,	whereas	successive	things	such	as	intervals	of	time	do	not.	Probably	we	can	safely	conceive	of	a	human	being	as	having	a	first	instant,	or	as	having	her	or	his	first	limit	closed,	as	equivalent	to	the	claim	that	a	state,	namely	the	existence	of	the	human	being,	has	a	first	instant,	or	has	its	first	limit	closed.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	 2.	 The	 so-called	 common	 theory	 about	 the	 limit	 decision	problem.	The	common	theory	dominated	almost	unrivalled	for	a	good	part	of	the	thirteenth	and	fourteenth	centuries.	However,	an	impressive	number	of	other	options	are	discussed	and,	with	the	passage	of	 time,	endorsed	as	well14.	It	is	not	my	aim	here	to	enter	into	the	question	of	what	historic	and	theoretical	 reasons	 have	 pushed	medieval	 authors	 to	 subscribe	 to	 the	common	 theory	or	 variations	 thereof.	What	 is	 relevant	 for	 our	 aims	 is	that,	 with	 the	 notable	 exceptions	 of	 Albert	 of	 Saxony	 and	 William	 of	Ockham15,	one	can	see	a	clear	tendency	shared	by	most	medieval	scholars																																									 																					
13	A.	de	Libera,	“La	problématique	de	l’instant	du	changement,”	66.	See	also	N.	Kretmann,	“Incipit/Desinit”;	N.	Strobach,	The	Moment	of	Change,	ch.	3.	
14	 See	 again	 N.	 Kretzmann,	 “Incipit/Desinit;”	 S.	 Knuuttila	 and	 Lehtinen,	 “Change	 and	Contradiction,”	and	A.	de	Libera,	“La	problématique	de	l’instant	du	changement.”	
15	See	A.	de	Libera,	“La	problématique	de	l’instant	du	changement,”	66.	
permanent entity 
successive entity 
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in	the	relevant	period,	to	ascribe	different	temporal	limits	to	permanent	and	successive	entities,	respectively.	This	difference	between	permanent	and	 successive	 entities	 as	 regards	 their	 temporal	 limits	 is	 the	 crucial	element	that	will	allow	us	to	trigger	the	argument	that	ultimately	leads	to	the	four-dimensional	view	of	persistence.	
2	 The	argument	for	four-dimensionalism	
The	first	part	of	this	paper	concluded	that	standard	medieval	solutions	to	the	limit	decision	problem	claim	that	permanent	and	successive	entities	have	different	temporal	limits.	For	example,	the	so-called	common	theory	claims	 that	 permanent	 entities	 have	 both	 limits	 closed,	 whereas	successive	entities	have	both	limits	open.	The	second	part	of	this	paper	argues	that	if	permanent	and	successive	entities	have	different	temporal	limits,	permanent	entities	are	impossible:	no	thing	can	be	permanent.	I	will	begin	by	 introducing	an	objection,	moved	by	Paul	Vincent	Spade,	against	theories	that	claim	that	permanent	and	successive	entities	have	different	 temporal	 limits	 (§2.1).	 Then	 I	 will	 introduce	 several	 recent	developments	in	contemporary	metaphysics	that	will	allow	us	to	realize	the	full	scope	of	Spade’s	objection	(§2.2	and	§2.3).	On	the	one	hand,	these	developments	 will	 allow	 us	 to	 circumvent	 Spade’s	 original	 objection.	However,	at	the	same	time,	such	developments	will	put	us	in	a	position	to	reinforce	Spade’s	objection	 in	a	way	 that	will	ultimately	 lead	us	 to	 the	impossibility	of	there	being	permanent	entities	(§2.4).	I	will	conclude	the	section	by	discussing	a	possible	way	out	from	the	reinforced	objection,	and	explain	why	it	is	ultimately	unsuccessful	(§2.5).		
2.1	 Spade’s	Objection	In	 a	 paper	 dedicated	 to	 Walter	 Burley’s	 aforementioned	 De	 Primo	 et	
Ultimo	Istanti,	Paul	Vincent	Spade	discusses	at	length	Burley’s	solution	to	the	 limit	 decision	 problem.	 Burley	 shares	 the	 common	 medieval	approach	 to	 the	 problem,	 and	 starts	 with	 distinguishing	 between	permanent	and	successive	entities	in	the	passage	quoted	before.	He	then	subscribes	 to	 the	 view	 according	 to	 which	 successive	 entities	 are	extrinsically	 limited	 at	 both	 ends,	 whereas	 permanent	 entities	 are	intrinsically	 limited	at	 their	beginning	but	extrinsically	 limited	at	 their	end.	In	 his	 paper,	 Spade	 not	 only	 investigates	 the	 reasons	why	Burley	may	have	held	such	a	view,	but	also	engages	critically	with	it	by	raising	a	series	
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of	remarks	and	objections.	One	of	them	is	particularly	relevant	here.	In	Spade’s	words:	If	every	interval	of	time	is	a	successive	entity,	as	Burley	says,	and	if	enduring	permanent	entities	have	a	first	instant	of	their	duration,	as	he	also	says,	 then	–	despite	what	Burley	explicitly	maintains	–	his	theory	 is	 unavoidably	 committed	 to	 allowing	 that	 at	 least	 some	successive	entities	have	a	first	instant	of	their	duration:	namely	the	
exact	intervals	of	enduring	permanent	entities’	durations.	Although	in	such	 a	 case	 the	 thing	 that	 fills	 the	 time-interval	 is	 an	 enduring	permanent	entity,	the	interval	of	its	duration	is	a	successive	one,	and	it	is	that	to	which	we	are	assigning	limits.	No	theory	can	consistently	assign	limits	to	temporal	intervals	in	a	way	different	than	it	assigns	them	to	the	durations	of	things	that	exactly	fill	those	intervals.	But	that	is	just	what	Burley’s	theory	tries	to	do. 16	Spade’s	 objection,	 in	 a	 nutshell,	 is	 that	 Burley’s	 theory	 leads	 to	 a	contradiction.	For	every	entity	that	is	in	time	there	should	be	an	instant	or	 interval	 that	 counts	 as	 its	 duration,	 and	 the	 entity	 and	 its	 duration	should	temporally	coincide.	A	permanent	entity	has	its	first	limit	closed.	Hence	 the	 interval	 that	 is	 its	 duration	 should	 also	 have	 its	 first	 limit	closed.	 However,	 given	 that	 a	 duration	 is	 an	 interval	 of	 time,	 it	 is	successive,	and	hence	must	have	its	first	limit	open.	It	 is	worth	noting	that	the	objection	as	such	does	not	apply	to	Burley’s	theory	alone.	It	generalizes	to	any	theory	that	prescribes	permanent	and	successive	entities	to	have	non-coinciding	temporal	limits,	regardless	of	whether	this	prescription	is	made	as	a	consequence	of	the	problem	of	the	instant	of	change	or	not.	For	example,	the	same	objection	affects	the	so-called	 common	 theory	 according	 to	 which	 permanent	 entities	 are	intrinsically	 limited	 at	 both	 ends,	 whereas	 successive	 entities	 are	extrinsically	limited	at	both	ends.	A	crucial	premise	of	Spade’s	objection	is	the	following	one:	(P)	 For	every	entity	that	is	in	time	there	is	an	instant	or	interval	that	counts	as	its	duration,	and	the	entity	and	its	duration	should	temporally	coincide,		or,	in	other	words,	that	the	former	should	begin	and	end	exactly	when	the	latter	does	and	vice	versa.	The	premise	seems	reasonable.	However	Spade	
																																								 																					
16	P.	Spade,	“How	to	Start	and	Stop,”	204.	
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does	not	spend	much	on	discussing	it.	Are	there	reasons	in	favour	of	 it	apart	from	its	apparent	reasonableness?	Let	us	have	a	look	at	the	same	problem	from	another	perspective.	Burley	claims	that	intervals	are	open.	One	could	take	this	as	proof	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	 the	 interval	of	 the	duration	of	a	permanent	entity,	 for	such	 an	 interval	 should	 be	 closed,	 but	 there	 are	 no	 closed	 intervals.	Burley,	 of	 course,	 does	not	 talk	 about	 the	 interval	 of	 the	duration	of	 a	permanent	entity;	he	only	talks	about	a	permanent	entity	having	a	first	and	a	last	instant.	So	the	question	is:	why	think	that	for	every	permanent	entity	there	should	be	an	interval	that	counts	as	its	duration?	Interestingly	 enough,	 contemporary	 philosophers	 have	 investigated	these	questions	under	a	slightly	different	terminology.	Spade’s	premise	concerns	the	relation	between	a	permanent	entity	and	the	interval	of	time	at	 which	 it	 exists,	 and	 more	 generally	 an	 entity	 and	 the	 region	 of	 a	dimension	where	 the	 entity	 can	be	 found.	 Contemporary	philosophers	have	long	investigated	that	relation	between	an	entity	and	a	region	where	it	 can	 be	 found	 under	 the	 name	 of	 location.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 will	introduce	 some	 basic	 findings	 and	 principles	 of	 the	 contemporary	metaphysics	of	location	that	will	help	us	answering	the	aforementioned	questions	concerning	Spade’s	premise.		
2.2	 The	contemporary	metaphysics	of	location	Contemporary	philosophers	call	location	the	relation	between	an	entity	and	a	region	of	a	dimension	where	the	entity	is	present.	The	term	location	is	probably	best	suited	for	the	spatial	case	only,	but	it	is	not	hard	to	see	that	the	relation	concerning	the	spatial	and	the	temporal	case,	if	not	the	same,	 belong	 to	 one	 and	 the	 same	 family	 –	 or	 so	 contemporary	philosophers	 think.	 Accordingly,	 we	 will	 say,	 for	 example,	 that	 I	 am	located	 at	 the	 region	 of	my	 office,	 but	 also	 that	WWI	 is	 located	 at	 the	twentieth	 century,	 and	more	 precisely	 at	 a	 four-year	 interval	 between	1914	and	191817.	One	 of	 the	 points	 on	 which	 contemporary	 philosophers	 insist	 is	 that	location	is	ambiguous.	Several	different	senses,	or	modes,	of	location	can	be	 carefully	 distinguished	 and	 defined.	 At	 least	 six	 different	modes	 of	location	have	been	distinguished	so	far,	but	here	we	will	focus	on	two	of	them	only,	which	are	usually	considered	the	central	ones,	namely	weak	and	 exact	 location.	 One	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 say	 that	 an	 entity	 is	weakly																																									 																					
17	See	R.	Casati	and	A.	Varzi,	Parts	and	Places:	The	Structures	of	Spatial	Representations	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1999);	R.	Casati	and	A.	Varzi,	“The	Structure	of	Spatial	Localization,”	
Philosophical	 Studies	 82	 (1996),	 205-239;	 J.	 Parsons,	 “Theories	 of	 Location,”	 in	Oxford	
Studies	in	Metaphysics,	Vol.	3,	eds.	K.	Bennett	and	D.	Zimmerman,	(Oxford,	2007),	201-232.	
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located	at	a	region	if	and	only	if	the	region	is	not	completely	free	of	it.	In	this	 general	 sense	 an	 entity	 can	 be	 located	 at	 several	 regions	 of	 a	dimension.	Consider	for	example	the	image	below,	depicting	a	grey	entity	
x	 and	a	 series	of	 red-dashed	regions	r1-r5.	The	grey	entity	x	 is	weakly	located	at	regions	r1,	r2,	r3	and	r4,	for	all	those	regions	are	not	completely	free	of	it,	but	it	is	not	weakly	located	at	region	r5,	which	is	completely	free	of	it.	On	the	other	hand,	we	say	that	an	entity	is	exactly	located	at	a	region	if	and	only	 if	x	 and	r	have	 the	same	shape,	 size,	and	stand	 in	 the	same	distance	relations	with	other	entities18.	Looking	back	at	the	image	below,	
x	 is	exactly	located	at	r1	only,	because	r1	is	the	only	region	that	has	its	same	shape,	size,	and	that	stands	in	its	same	distance	relations	with	other	entities	 –	 for	 example	 the	other	 regions	 in	 the	 image	–	 in	 the	 relevant	dimension.			
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	 3.	 Weak	 and	 exact	 location.	 The	 squared	 grey	 entity	 x	 is	weakly	located	at	regions	r1,	r2,	r3,	r4,	is	exactly	located	only	at	r1.	It	is	neither	exactly	nor	weakly	located	at	r5.	Having	 distinguished	 and	 informally	 characterized	 weak	 and	 exact	location,	one	important	question	that	poses	itself	is:	what	is	the	relation	between	these	two	modes	of	location?	Because	of	the	conceptual	vicinity	between	 the	 two	 concepts	 of	 location,	 and	because	of	 other	 important	
																																								 																					
18	 C.	 Gilmore,	 “Where	 in	 the	Relativistic	World	Are	We?”	Philosophical	 Perspectives	 20	(2006),	 199-236,	 C.	 Gilmore,	 “Persistence	 and	 Location	 in	 Relativistic	 Spacetime,”	
Philosophy	Compass	3	(2008),	1224-1254.		
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reasons19,	most	philosophers	think	that	in	principle	one	mode	should	be	definable	in	terms	of	the	other.	Probably,	the	most	intuitive	option	is	to	take	exact	location	as	a	primitive	and	define	a	weak	location	as	any	region	which	overlaps	an	exact	location20.	So	for	example	x	is	weakly	located	at	region	r4	because	r4	overlaps	its	exact	location	r1.	A	crucial	result	that	follows	from	this	definition	of	weak	location	in	terms	of	exact	 location	is	that	anything	that	 is	weakly	located	at	a	region	will	also	have	 an	 exact	 location,	 for	 a	weak	 location	of	x	 is	 any	 region	 that	overlaps	 with	 x’s	 exact	 location.	 This	 principle	 is	 usually	 called,	 for	obvious	reasons,	exactness21:	(E)	 	anything	that	is	weakly	located	in	a	dimension	must	also	have	an	exact	location		 in	that	dimension.	Could	 exactness	 offer	 the	 much	 needed	 justification	 for	 the	 crucial	premise	of	Spade’s	objection?	At	first	glance,	it	seems	that	it	can.	Recall	that	 the	premise	was	that	an	entity	and	 its	duration	should	temporally	coincide.	The	premise	seems	to	rely	on	the	intuition	that	when	an	entity	is	 located	 in	 time,	 there	should	be	a	region	of	 time	which	counts	as	 its	exact	location,	and	this	is	exactly	what	is	required	by	the	aforementioned	principle	of	exactness,	which	therefore,	I	suspect,	was	what	Spade	had	in	mind.	However	things	are	not	so	obvious	on	closer	look.	Spade’s	premise	does	not	only	require	that	a	permanent	entity	have	an	exact	temporal	location.	It	 also	 requires	 that	 this	 location	 be	 an	 interval	 of	 time.	 This	 further	requirement	cannot	properly	speaking	be	derived	from	exactness,	which	only	requires	permanent	entities,	which	are	in	time,	to	have	at	least	an	exact	 temporal	 location,	 without	 specifying	 that	 that	 exact	 temporal	location	 should	be	 an	 interval.	This	difference	 is	 indeed	 crucial.	But	 in	order	to	see	why	it	is,	we	should	now	introduce	some	basic	notions	in	the	contemporary	metaphysics	of	persistence,	and	in	particular	explain	how	three-dimensionalism	is	nowadays	defined.		
2.3 What	is	three-dimensionalism?	Recall	 that	 three-dimensionalism	 is	 the	 view	 according	 to	 which	substances	 are	 not	 extended	 through	 time	 and	 persist	 through	 time	without	 having	 temporal	 parts.	Prima	 facie	 the	 definition	 is	 somehow	puzzling.	How	is	it	that	something	which	is	not	extended	through	time	still	occupies,	in	a	certain	sense,	an	interval	of	time	which	is	extended,	namely																																									 																					
19	See	M.	Leonard,	“Locating	Gunky	Water	and	Wine,”	Ratio	27	(2014),	306-315.		
20	J.	Parsons,	“Theories	of	Location,”	204.	
21	J.	Parsons,	“Theories	of	location,”	205.	
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the	interval	of	its	persistence?	An	answer	to	this	question	can	be	and	has	been	recently	given	 in	 light	of	 the	advancements	 in	 the	metaphysics	of	location	presented	before.	The	basic	idea	is	this.	According	to	three-dimensionalism,	substances	are	not	extended	through	time	–	they	are	three-,	and	not	four-,	dimensional.	If	a	substance	is	not	extended	through	time,	it	cannot	be	exactly	located	at	 intervals	 of	 time.	 This	 is	 because	 intervals	 of	 time	 are	 temporally	extended,	and	recall	 that	an	entity	shares	shape	and	size	with	 its	exact	locations.	If	a	substance	is	not	exactly	located	at	intervals	of	time,	it	must	be	 located	at	 instants	of	 time.	And	 it	can	cover	an	extended	 interval	of	time	by	being	exactly	located	at	each	instant	that	makes	up	that	interval.	In	other	words,	the	idea	is	that	a	three-dimensional	entity	that	persists	through	time	is	an	entity	that	persists	by	being	exactly	located	at	several	instants	of	time.	In	this	way	it	can	both	be	temporally	unextended	and	yet	persist	through	an	extended	interval	of	time.	Defined	in	this	way,	three-dimensional	 entities	 differ	 from	 four-dimensional	 ones	 in	 that	 four-dimensional	 entities	 are	 extended	 through	 time,	 and	 hence	 have	 a	temporally	extended	interval	of	time	as	their	exact	temporal	location22.	It	is	worth	noting	that	some	philosophers	prefer	to	talk	of	spatiotemporal	instead	 of	merely	 temporal	 location.	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 three-dimensional	entity	will	 cover	a	 four-dimensional	 spacetime	 region	by	being	exactly	located	at	several,	 three-dimensional,	 instantaneous	spacetime	regions,	whereas	a	four-dimensional	entity	will	cover	the	same	four-dimensional	spacetime	 region	 by	 being	 exactly	 located	 at	 it.	 The	 spatiotemporal	approach	delivers	immediately	why	three-dimensional	entities	and	four-dimensional	entities	are	called	in	this	way.	Recall	that	an	entity	shares	the	shape	 of	 its	 exact	 location.	 Three-dimensional	 entities	 are	 located	 at	three-dimensional	spacetime	regions,	and	hence	have	three-dimensional	shapes,	 whereas	 four-dimensional	 entities	 are	 located	 at	 four-dimensional	 spacetime	 regions,	 and	 hence	 have	 four-dimensional	shapes23.						 																																								 																					
22	T.	Bittner	and	M.	Donnelly,	“A	Classification	of	Spatio-temporal	Entities	Based	on	Their	Location	 in	 Space-time,”	 in	 International	 Workshop	 on	 Semantic-based	 Geographical	
Information	 Systems,	 ed.	 E.	 Zimanyi	 (Dordrecht,	 2006),	 1626-1635;	 T.	 Sattig,	 The	
Language	and	Reality	of	Time	(Oxford	2006);	C.	Gilmore,	“Where	in	the	Relativistic	World	Are	We?.”	
23	C.	Gilmore,	“Where	in	the	Relativistic	World	Are	We?.”	
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Figure	 4.	 Three-	 and	 four-dimensionalism.	 On	 the	 left,	 a	 four-dimensional	 entity	 occupies	 a	 four-dimensional	 region	 by	 being	exactly	 located	 at	 it.	 On	 the	 right,	 a	 three-dimensional	 entity	occupies	 a	 four-dimensional	 region	 by	 being	 exactly	 located	 at	several	instantaneous	regions	making	up	that	region.	Now	we	are	 in	a	position	 to	 see	why	a	 three-dimensionalist	 can	 reject	Spade’s	 premise	 and	 yet	 keep	 exactness.	 First,	 recall	 we	 are	 working	under	the	hypothesis	that	permanent	simply	means	three-dimensional.	A	three-dimensionalist	will	then	reject	Spade’s	premise,	because	it	requires	that	a	permanent	–	hence	three-dimensional	–	entity	is	exactly	located	at	an	 interval,	 whereas	 the	 three-dimensionalist	 thinks	 that	 three-dimensional	entities	are	not	exactly	located	at	intervals.	Yet,	in	so	doing	the	three-dimensionalist	will	keep	exactness,	because	three-dimensional	entities	have	indeed	exact	temporal	locations,	namely	the	instants	of	time	that	make	up	the	interval	of	their	persistence.		
2.4 Spade’s	objection	reinforced	In	 the	 previous	 section,	 we	 have	 seen	 how	 in	 light	 of	 the	 recent	developments	 in	 the	metaphysics	 of	 location	 and	 persistence,	 Spade’s	objection	–	or	at	 least	 the	 first	 reading	 that	 I	have	given	 to	 it	 –	 can	be	ultimately	resisted.	Yet,	this	does	not	mean	that	Spade’s	objection	cannot	be	 reinforced	 in	 a	way	 to	 be	 successful.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 shall	 indeed	present	a	reinforced	version	of	Spade’s	objection	which	will	conclude	that	if	we	assign	temporal	limits	to	permanent	entities	in	a	different	way	from	the	 one	 we	 use	 for	 successive	 ones,	 a	 contradiction	 follows	 and	permanent	entities	are	thus	impossible.	I	shall	present	the	argument	as	
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an	 argument	 directed	 against	 the	 common	 theory	 but	 in	 principle	 the	argument	 can	 be	 easily	 adapted	 to	 any	 theory	 according	 to	 which	permanent	and	successive	entities	have	different	temporal	limits.	I	will	leave	to	the	reader	the	task	of	adapting	the	argument	to	her	or	his	favorite	version	of	such	a	theory.	The	 argument	 runs	 as	 follows.	 Think	 again	 over	 the	 duration	 of	 a	permanent	entity.	The	duration	of	 a	permanent	entity	 is	 an	 interval	of	time.	It	is	not	the	exact	location	of	that	entity,	because	permanent	entities	are	only	located	at	instants	and	not	at	intervals.	Rather,	the	duration	of	a	permanent	entity	should	be	conceived	as	 the	sum	of	all	 the	 instants	at	which	the	permanent	entity	is	exactly	located24.	It	can	be	proven	that	this	sum	is	an	interval	of	time	which	is	intrinsically	limited	at	both	ends.	First,	let	us	prove	that	it	is	an	interval	of	time.	It	is,	because	an	interval	of	time	is	a	sum	of	instants	connected	by	the	order	of	temporal	 succession	 that	 is	 limited	 by	 two	 instants	 and	 such	 that	 any	instant	that	lies	between	the	two	limiting	instants	is	also	included	in	the	sum25.	 The	 two	 limiting	 instants	 are	 the	 first	 and	 last	 instant	 of	 the	existence	of	the	permanent	entity.	And	granted	that	the	existence	of	the	permanent	entity	is	not	intermittent,	all	instants	that	lie	in	between	the	limiting	instants	are	also	included	in	the	sum.	Second,	let	us	prove	that	this	interval	of	time	has	both	limits	closed.	An	interval	of	time	has	both	limits	closed	 if	and	only	 if	 the	two	 limiting	 instants	are	 included	 in	the	sum	that	is	the	interval26.	And	the	limiting	instants	of	a	permanent	entity	are	 included	 in	 that	 sum,	 for	 a	 permanent	 entity	 has	 a	 first	 and	 a	 last	instant	of	its	existence	and	hence	at	which	it	is	exactly	located.	Given	what	we	have	just	said,	we	can	conclude	that	the	interval	of	time	which	is	the	duration	of	the	permanent	entity	is	an	interval	of	time	which	is	 closed	 at	 both	 ends.	 However,	 since	 it	 is	 an	 interval	 of	 time,	 it	 is	successive,	and	hence	it	is	open	at	both	ends.	Contradiction.		
2.5 Transcendentist	endurantism	to	the	rescue?	So	 far	 we	 have	 only	 considered	 the	 form	 of	 three-dimensionalism	according	 to	 which	 substances	 persist	 through	 time	 without	 having	temporal	 parts	 by	 being	 exactly	 located	 at	 several	 instants	 of	 time.	Nowadays	 this	 is	 certainly	 considered	 the	 standard	 form	 of	 three-																																								 																					
24	 This	 is	 indeed	 one	 of	 the	 six	 aforementioned	 modes	 of	 location	 distinguished	 by	contemporary	 philosophers.	 Usually,	 it	 is	 called	 the	 path	 of	 an	 entity	 in	 the	 given	dimension,	and	is	indeed	defined	as	the	mereological	sum	of	all	the	entity’s	exact	locations	in	that	dimension.	Cf.	C.	Gilmore,	“Where	in	the	Relativistic	World	Are	We?.”	
25	M.	C.	Gemignani,	Elementary	Topology	(New	York,	1990).	
26	M.	C.	Gemignani,	Elementary	Topology	(New	York,	1990).	
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dimensionalism.	However,	it	is	not	the	only	form	of	three-dimensionalism	on	 the	market.	There	 is	 another	way	of	defining	 three-dimensionalism	that	does	not	require	substances	to	have	exact	temporal	 locations.	 It	 is	the	 so	 called	 transcendentist	 theory	 of	 persistence,	 or	 transcendentist	
endurantism.	 The	 transcendentist	 theory	 of	 persistence	 denies	 that	substances	 are	 weakly	 or	 exactly	 located	 at	 regions	 of	 time.	 In	 other	words,	it	denies	that	the	relation	between	a	substance	and	the	times	at	which	it	exist	is	a	relation	of	location.	Rather,	it	defines	such	a	relation	in	terms	of	the	events	and	processes	in	which	such	a	substance	participates.	Accordingly,	the	theory	claims	that	for	a	substance	to	exist	at	a	time	is	for	it	to	participate	in	an	event	which	is	weakly	located	at	that	time27.	The	transcendentist	theory	of	persistence	is	based	on	various	semantic	and	 metaphysical	 grounds	 on	 which	 I	 will	 not	 focus	 here.	 What	 is	important	 here	 is	 rather	 the	 question	 whether	 conceiving	 of	 three-dimensionalism,	 and	 hence	 of	 permanence,	 in	 this	 way	 will	 help	 the	three-dimensionalist	out	of	the	reinforced	objection.	The	answer	to	this	question	 is	 in	 the	 negative.	 According	 to	 transcendentist	 endurantism,	substances	exist	at	times	if	and	only	if	they	participate	in	events	that	are	located	at	those	times.	For	example,	a	human	being	exists	at	the	interval	of	 its	 persistence	 because	 it	 participates	 in	 her	 or	 his	 life,	 which	 is	 a	temporally	extended	event	which	is	located	at	that	interval.	Now	either	events	are	successive	or	permanent.	 If	 the	 former,	which	seems	 in	any	case	to	be	the	most	plausible	option,	then	events	would	not	have	a	first	and	a	last	instant,	and	so	also	the	life	of	the	human	being	would	not	have	a	first	and	a	last	instant.	Hence,	also	the	existence	of	a	human	being	would	not	have	a	first	and	a	last	instant,	given	that	for	a	substance	to	exist	at	a	time	is	for	it	to	participate	in	an	event	located	at	that	time.	If	the	latter,	then	events	would	be	three-dimensional	and	located	in	time,	so	the	view	would	in	any	case	fall	prey	to	the	reinforced	objection	presented	before.	
																																								 																					
27	A.	Giordani	and	D.	Costa,	“From	Times	to	Worlds	and	Back	Again:	A	Transcendentist	Theory	of	Persistence,”	Thought:	A	Journal	of	Philosophy	2	(2013),	210-220;	D.	Costa,	“The	Transcendentist	 Theory	 of	 Persistence,”	 The	 Journal	 of	 Philosophy	 (forthcoming);	 P.	Simons,	Parts.	A	Study	in	Ontology	(Oxford,	1987);	P.	Simons,	“Where	is	it	At?	Modes	of	Occupation	 and	 Kinds	 of	 Occupant,”	 in	 Mereology	 and	 Location,	 ed.	 S.	 Kleinschmidt	(Oxford	2014),	59-68	and	B.	van	Fraassen,	An	Introduction	to	the	Philosophy	of	Time	and	
Space	 (New	 York,	 1970),	 when	 similar	 views,	 if	 not	 the	 same,	 are	 sympathetically	discussed.	
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3	 Conclusions	
To	sum	up,	recent	advancements	 in	 the	metaphysics	of	 location	and	of	persistence	 led	us	 to	 see	 that	 even	 if	 Spade’s	original	 objection	 can	be	resisted,	 a	 reinforced	 version	 of	 it	 is	 successful,	 and	 shows	 that	 if	 the	limits	 of	 permanent	 and	 successive	 entities	 are	 assigned	 differently,	 a	contradiction	follows.	When	confronted	with	this	results,	several	options	are	available.	Just	to	mention	one	obvious	option,	a	three-dimensionalist	could	 take	 these	 results	 as	 a	 reductio	 ad	 absurdum	 of	 the	 idea	 that	permanent	 and	 successive	 entities	 have	 different	 temporal	 limits.	However,	 if	 one	 takes	 seriously	 the	aforementioned	medieval	 theories,	and	in	particular	takes	seriously:	(i)	the	distinction	between	permanent	and	 successive	 entities,	 (ii)	 that	 this	 distinction	 parallels	 the	contemporary	 one	 between	 three-	 and	 four-dimensional	 entities,	 (iii)	that	the	nature	of	permanent	and	successive	entities	require	them	to	have	different	 temporal	 limits,	 (iv)	 that	 intervals	 of	 time	 are	 successive	entities,	then	the	most	obvious	conclusion	seems	to	be	that	permanence,	i.e.	 persistence	without	 temporal	parts,	 is	 impossible.	Moreover,	 if	 one	takes	 seriously	 the	 idea	 that	 (v)	 there	 are	 substances,	 and	 that	 (vi)	substances	 persist	 through	 time,	 the	 only	 possible	 conclusion	 to	 draw	seems	to	be	that	substances	persist	by	being	successive	entities,	 i.e.	by	having	different	temporal	parts	at	different	times.	In	other	words,	tenets	(i)-(vi)	imply	the	four-dimensional	view	of	persistence.	I	conclude	by	letting	the	reader	decide	whether,	if	confronted	with	this	problem,	medieval	scholars	would	rather	embrace	four-dimensionalism,	reject	 one	 out	 of	 tenets	 (i)-(vi),	 or	 attack	my	 argument	 in	 some	 other	interesting	way.	Moreover,	 I	will	not	be	surprised	 if	some	historians	of	philosophy	will	think	that	the	meddling	of	contemporary	notions	in	the	medieval	lines	of	reasoning	constitutes	an	inadmissible	anachronism	that	leads	 us	 to	 a	 fundamentally	 distorted	 interpretation	 of	 medieval	philosophy	in	general.	On	the	contrary,	I	hope	that	the	close	interaction	that	I	have	put	at	work	in	this	paper	will	show	the	impressive	possibilities	that	are	open	once	contemporary	and	medieval	metaphysics	are	put	at	work	 together,	 and	 that	 the	 case	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 persistence	through	time	is	an	emblematic	case	of	the	possibility	of	this	convergence	–	one	that	remains,	as	yet,	largely	uncharted.				
